Abstarct: DC microgrids with distributed controllers use data exchange between buses to achieve objectives such as voltage regulation and current sharing among buses. As a result, they are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. These attacks are executed on the communication lixnk to destabilize or disrupt the equilibrium point of the system. The primary goal of this dissertation is to detect and identify attacks, maintain stability during an attack, and mitigate the attack from the DC microgrid. To this end, the effects of various attacks and the reasons behind the network's instability are initially examined. baxsed on the results of this examination, an attack detection method is proposed baxsed on the internal parameters of the secondary controller. This method is enhanced by implementing integral local feedback at each bus, which ensures the stability of the DC microgrid under attack conditions. Additionally, to reduce traffic load and estimate the size and location of the attack, an event-baxsed method is used for data transmission. The event rule is adjusted according to the Lyapunov function, and the method is designed to be Zeno-free. Given that the time of the attack is detected, the size of the attack on each lixnk can be determined by the difference between the event before and after the attack. Consequently, the attacks are identified and removed from the control inputs. Ultimately, the stability of the secondary controller of the microgrid, despite the false data injection attack, is proven. The performance of all proposed methods is demonstrated through simulations and practical implementation